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The internet has no shortage of photographs and videos showing armed 
men in Crimea who look like members of the Russian military. Their 
guns are the same as those used by the Russian army, their lorries have 
Russian number plates and they speak in Russian accents. Yet accord-
ing to President Vladimir Putin, they are in fact members of “self-
defence groups” organised by the locals who bought all their uniforms 
and hardware in a shop. This poses a challenge to the media covering 
the crisis: what do you call people who are officially not there?1 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
        n March 1, 2014 a combination of Russian regular armed forces and 
unidentified operatives occupied the recognized territory of Ukraine on the 
Crimean peninsula.2 Approximately two weeks later Russian forces mobi-
lized along Ukraine’s eastern border in support of separatist forces engag-
ing in hostilities with the Ukrainian government.3 President Vladimir Putin, 
in eventually acknowledging the Russian occupation of Crimea, argued for 
                                                                                                                      
1. Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little Green Men” or “Russian Invaders”?, BBC (Mar. 11, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154. 
2. Tim Sullivan & Vladimir Isachenkov, Russian Troops Take Over Ukraine’s Crimea 
Region, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 1, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/russian-troops-over-ukra 
ines-crimea-region-200052097.html (“Russian troops took over the strategic Crimean 
peninsula . . . without firing a shot.”). 
3. Steven Lee Meyers & Alison Smale, Russian Troops Mass at Border With Ukraine, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/eur 
ope/ukraine.html?_r=1 (“[T]he buildup on Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia signaled 
possible further moves by the Kremlin to reassert authority by force over territory, also 
heavily populated by Russians, forfeited in the Soviet Union breakup two decades ago.”). 
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the legitimacy of the territorial violation by claiming a moral imperative to 
act on behalf of Russian-speaking minorities on the peninsula.4 In contrast, 
while admittedly in agreement with the pro-Russian secession movement, 
the Russian Federation denied intervening in the civil war occurring in 
eastern Ukraine.5 As an occupation and a civil war are simultaneously tak-
ing place in Ukraine6 a particularly vexing international law question is pre-
sented: what is the legal status of those involved in the hostilities?  
This article is designed to answer that question and to identify the asso-
ciated rights, duties and responsibilities of the participants in the conflict.7 
As classifying a conflict is a condition precedent for determining an indi-
vidual’s status in that conflict, it is important to first define the Ukrainian 
hostilities. Despite clear Russian involvement, this is not a simple task. 
While the Crimea occupation is clearly international in character,8 the con-
                                                                                                                      
4. See, e.g., Transcript: Putin Defends Russian Intervention in Ukraine, WASHINGTON POST, 
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-defends-russian- 
intervention-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/9cadcd1a-a3a9-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html 
(President Putin explaining that the intervention in Ukraine is based upon a request for aid 
by the deposed legitimate government, as well as for various humanitarian purposes, 
including protecting citizens from anti-Semitic violence). But see Harriet Torry & Bertrand 
Benoit, Watchdog Sees No Threat to Ethnic Russians, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 12, 2014, 
at A10 (noting that the Council of Europe, an organization that eschews political 
judgment, made clear that there was no legal justification for Russia’s intervention into 
Crimea, and quoting Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, as 
saying “we don’t actually see any signs of real threat to the minorities or the Russian 
majorities [in Ukraine].”). 
5. Thousands of Russian Soldiers Sent to Ukraine, Say Rights Groups, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 
1, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/01/russian-soldiers-ukraine-righ 
ts-groups (quoting Sergei Nikitin, Director for Amnesty International in Russia, “The 
Kremlin is determined to muzzle its critics and keep a strong lid on any information which 
suggests that Russia plays a direct part in the conflict in Ukraine, although evidence to the 
contrary is mounting every day.”). 
6. See John Vandiver, SACEUR: Allies Must Prepare for Russia Hybrid War, STARS & 
STRIPES (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/09/05/saceur-allies-
must-prepare-for-russia-hybrid-war.html (discussing the combination of tactics used by 
Russia in Ukraine). 
7. See Sean Watts, The Notion of Combatancy in Cyber Warfare, in 4TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 235, 239 (Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis & Katherine 
Ziolkowski eds., 2012), available at https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2012/proceedings/d2r1s10 
_watts.pdf. Professor Watt’s conference paper updates concepts and ideas developed 
previously in great depth in Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392 (2009). 
8. An international armed conflict exists in “all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
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flict in eastern Ukraine is more akin to a civil war.9 The combination of 
State and non-State actors battling in the same geographic area10 makes sta-
tus determinations for those participating extraordinarily difficult.11 Con-
ducting this analysis requires viewing the Ukrainian hostilities as an interna-
tional and non-international armed conflict existing in parallel. Through 
this conflict classification paradigm individual status determinations are 
possible and, subsequently, concomitant legal responsibilities and protec-
tions associated with those determinations are clarified.  
                                                                                                                      
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them” and in “cases of partial or total 
occupation.” Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]. The 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, which supplements the Geneva Conventions, also applies “in the situation 
referred to in Article 2,” as well as in those “armed conflicts which peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise 
of their right of self-determination.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflict art. 1(3)–(4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP I]. 
9. “Armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one 
of the High Contracting Parties” is defined as a non-international armed conflict. See GC 
III, supra note 8, art. 3. Additional Protocol II supplements “Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions,” but limits the applicability of the law to only those situations where 
“dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups” which are “under responsible 
command” exercise “control over a part” of a State. See Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflict art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. It 
is important to note that the United States has not ratified AP I or AP II, but finds many 
portions of the protocols to be customary international law. See generally Michael J. 
Matheson, Remarks on the United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to 
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 419 (1987). 
10. With an amalgamation of international and non-international characteristics, the 
entirety of the Ukraine conflict is perhaps best described as a “hybrid war.” A hybrid war 
can refer to those conflicts that are a combination of unconventional and conventional 
tactics. See, e.g., Shane Reeves & Rob Barnsby, The New Griffin of International Law: Hybrid 
Armed Conflicts, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Winter 2013, at 16, 17. Or it can 
refer to those that are both international and non-international in character. See, e.g., Steven 
Haines, The Nature of War and the Character of Contemporary Armed Conflict, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 9, 23 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst 
ed., 2012). 
11. See generally Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (highlighting the difficulty of 
prosecuting individuals when an internal and international armed conflict are taking place 
simultaneously). 
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Identifying the actors on the Ukrainian battlefields and outlining their 
legal responsibilities and obligations is not simply an academic exercise. It 
is a practical necessity for ensuring that both conflict participants and other 
persons not engaged in the hostilities are treated in accordance with the 
well-established humanitarian principles embedded within the law of armed 
conflict. Further, crystallizing the battlefield status of the actors eliminates 
any later claims of ignorance, while simultaneously increasing the likelihood 
of accountability. The importance of determining the status of the actors in 
Ukraine is one particularly effective method of ensuring that the conflict 
does not further devolve into unchecked “brutality and savagery.”12   
As it is important to understand a chronology of the Ukraine conflict, 
the article begins with a brief background section. Sections on conflict clas-
sification and international law as it relates to battlefield status determina-
tions will follow as both are germane to understanding the status of the 
Ukrainian participants. It concludes with a status determination for each 
participant in the hostilities and a reminder that all parties to the conflict 
are obligated to comply with the law of armed conflict.  
 
II.   BACKGROUND TO THE UKRAINE HOSTILITIES 
 
On February 7, 2014 the XXII Olympic Winter Games’ opening ceremony 
took place at the Fisht Olympic Stadium in Sochi, Russia.13 Costing billions 
of dollars,14 the games were widely seen as an opportunity for President 
Putin to “show off Russia as a resurgent superpower.”15 However, the cel-
ebration was quickly upset on February 23 with the ouster of Viktor Yanu-
kovych, the pro-Russian President of Ukraine. Political unrest in Ukraine 
                                                                                                                      
12. Rob McLauglin, The Law of Armed Conflict and International Human Rights Law: Some 
Paradigmatic Differences and Operational Implications, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 213, 222 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2010) (citing UNITED KINGDOM 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 1.8 (2004)). 
13. Sochi 2014 Opening Ceremony: Russia Welcomes the World, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www 
.olympic.org/sochi-2014/opening-ceremony (last visited Apr. 20, 2015). 
14. How much the Sochi Olympics cost is debatable. Some sources have reported the 
cost at upwards of fifty billion dollars while others dispute this claim. See, e.g., Paul Farhi, 
Did the Winter Olympics in Sochi Really Cost $50 billion? A Closer Look at that Figure, 
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/did 
-the-winter-olympics-in-sochi-really-cost-50-billion-a-closer-look-at-that-figure/2014/02/ 
10/a29e37b4-9260-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html. 
15. Rick Broadbent & Ben Hoyle, Olympic Ring Fails to Light, but the Rest is a Red-hot 
Spectacle, TIMES (London) (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/sport/olympics 
/article3999518.ece. 
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had been simmering since November 2013 when Ukraine rejected a part-
nership accord with the European Union (EU) in favor of closer ties with 
Russia.16 As protests continued throughout the winter the Yanukovych 
government became increasingly heavy handed, culminating in government 
snipers killing and wounding hundreds of protestors in Kiev on February 
19.17 The harsh tactics galvanized the anti-government protestors leading 
thousands to fill Kiev’s Independence Square to demand Yanukovych’s 
removal.18 On February 22, in an emergency session, the Ukrainian parlia-
ment voted 380–0 to remove Yanukovych from office, accused him of be-
ing “guilty of gross human rights violations and dereliction of duty” and set 
new presidential elections for May 25.19  
While the deposed Yanukovych fled to his Russian-speaking political 
base in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine,20 the response from many 
to the political turmoil was overwhelmingly positive. The United States ap-
plauded the “constructive work” of the Ukrainian parliament and urged 
“the prompt formation of a broad, technocratic government of national 
unity.”21 The EU, viewing the Ukraine events as a humiliating geopolitical 
setback to Putin,22 openly supported the interim government and called on 
the Russian government to recognize the territorial integrity of Ukraine.23 
                                                                                                                      
16. See James Marson, Alan Cullison & Alexander Kolyandr, Ukraine President Viktor 
Yanukovych Driven from Power, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www 
.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304914204579398561953855036. 
17. See id. 
18. See William Booth, Ukraine’s Parliament Votes to Oust President; Former Prime Minster is 
Freed from Prison, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/world/europe/ukraines-yanukovych-missing-as-protesters-take-control-of-presidenti 
al-residence-in-kiev/2014/02/22/802f7c6c-9bd2-11e3-ad71-e03637a299c0_story.html. 
19. Id. 
20. See id. 
21. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press 
Secretary on Ukraine (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 
14/02/22/statement-press-secretary-ukraine.  
22. See Will Englund, Putin Takes Losses on Ukraine, but Russia Still has Leverage and the 
Will to Use it, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wo 
rld/putin-takes-losses-on-ukraine-but-russia-still-has-leverage-and-the-will-to-use-it/2014/ 
02/23/80d832ba-9cbf-11e3-ad71-e03637a299c0_story.html (discussing the importance of 
Ukraine to Putin’s goal of creating the Eurasian Customs Union, an envisioned economic 
counterbalance to the EU and the United States). 
23. See Stefan Fule, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Remarks during European Parliament Plenary Debate on Ukraine 
at Strasbourg, France: EU response to events in Ukraine (Feb. 26, 2014), http://eu 
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-162_en.htm (“[I]t puts a greater re-sponsibility 
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Western prognosticators, though quietly recognizing the historic and con-
temporary importance of Ukraine to Russia, saw any military response to 
the Yanukovych removal as implausible.24 These predictions were quickly 
proven wrong when on February 27 armed men seized the Crimean par-
liament25 and raised the Russian flag.26 
Simultaneous with the parliamentary take-over, “heavily armed Rus-
sian-speaking troops poured into Crimea, seizing airports and other key 
installations throughout the peninsula.”27 Carrying Russian weapons and 
wearing Russian uniforms, but with no identifying insignia, these seemingly 
professional soldiers were dubbed “little green men” by the local Ukraini-
ans.28 While the occupiers quickly swept through the peninsula, Putin de-
nied Russian involvement, claiming the armed men to be local Crimean 
self-defense forces.29 Despite these denials, on March 1 Putin received au-
thorization from the Russian Federation’s upper house of parliament for 
use of regular troops already stationed in Crimea to “seize control of the 
peninsula and its mechanisms of government.”30 In response, the interim 
President of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, stated, “[w]e consider the be-
                                                                                                                      
on the new Ukrainian government—interim and beyond—to deliver the changes the 
people have asked and fought for. It puts also a greater responsibility on the European 
Union to extend all our support and expertise to ensure that these changes are put on 
solid ground and will be sustainable.”). 
24. See, e.g., Simon Shuster, No, Russia Will Not Intervene in Ukraine, TIME (Feb. 25, 
2014), http://time.com/9826/russia-ukraine-putin-intervene/. 
25. Crimea has immense strategic importance to Russia as the home of its Black Sea 
Fleet, as well as a large contingent of ethnic Russians. See Paul N. Schwartz, Crimea’s 
Strategic Value to Russia, CSIS (Mar. 18, 2014), http://csis.org/blog/crimeas-strategic-
value-russia. 
26. See Gabriela Baczynska, Pavel Polityuk & Raissa Kasolowsky, Timeline: Political 
Crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s Occupation of Crimea, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2014), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-ukraine-crisis-timeline-idUSBREA270PO20140 
308. 
27. STEVEN WOEHREL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RL33460, UKRAINE: 
CURRENT ISSUES AND U.S. POLICY 2 (Sept. 4, 2014) (“Russia responded to the change of 
government in Kyiv by seizing Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.”). 
28. See Steven Pifer, Opinion, Watch Out for Little Green Men, BROOKINGS (July 7, 
2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/07/07-watch-out-little-green-
men-pifer. 
29. See WOEHREL, supra note 27, at 2. 
30. See Kathy Lally, Will Englund & William Booth, Russian Parliament Approves Use of 
Troops in Ukraine, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/europe/russian-parliament-approves-use-of-troops-in-crimea/2014/03/01/d1775f 
70-a151-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html. 
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havior of the Russian Federation to be direct aggression against the sover-
eignty of Ukraine.”31 The U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry echoed this 
sentiment calling the actions an “incredible act of aggression” and a viola-
tion of international law.32 
Ignoring these complaints, and rebuffing efforts to solve the crisis,33 
Russia moved to further its control of the peninsula by setting a March 16 
referendum for the people of Crimea to vote on whether the Russian Fed-
eration should annex the territory.34 Although dismissed by the United 
States and most of Europe as illegal, 95.5 percent of those voting support-
ed the idea of joining the Russian Federation.35 On March 18, after receiv-
ing a standing ovation from the Russian parliament, President Putin agreed 
to sign a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation, stating that the 
peninsula has always been a “part of Russia.”36 In denouncing Russia’s ac-
tions, U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden called the annexation “nothing more 
than a land grab,” while United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron 
stated that “it is completely unacceptable for Russia to use force to change 
borders on the basis of a sham referendum held at the barrel of a Russian 
gun.”37 The Ukrainian government, stating that they would never recognize 
the illegal annexation, declared that the crisis had “moved from the political 
to the military stage.”38  
                                                                                                                      
31. Id. 
32. Will Dunham, Kerry Condemns Russia’s “Incredible Act of Aggression” in Ukraine, 
REUTERS, (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/us-ukraine-crisis-
usa-kerry-idUSBREA210DG20140302 (stating “[i]t’s an incredible act of aggression. It is 
really a stunning, willful choice by President (Vladimir) Putin to invade another country. 
Russia is in violation of the sovereignty of Ukraine. Russia is in violation of its 
international obligations.”). 
33. See Baczynska, Polityuk & Kasolowsky, supra note 26 (noting that warning shots 
were “fired to prevent an unarmed observer mission sent by the OSCE from entering 
Crimea” and that Russian forces had become “increasingly aggressive towards Ukrainian 
troops trapped in bases”). 
34. Id. 
35. See Crimea Referendum: Voters “Back Russia Union,” BBC (Mar. 16, 2014), http://w 
ww.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097 (stating that many loyal to Kiev boycotted 
the voting). 
36. See Ukraine Crisis: Putin Signs Russia-Crimea Treaty, BBC (Mar. 18, 2014), http://w 
ww.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26630062 (“President Putin told parliament that figures 
from the Crimea vote were ‘more than convincing.’”). 
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
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The occupation of Crimea became just one front in a broader conflict 
when on March 12 Russian troops were spotted massing along Ukraine’s 
eastern border.39 While eastern Ukraine, particularly in the cities of Do-
netsk and Luhansk, was the epicenter of pro-Russian protests following the 
removal of Yanukovych from office,40 conventional Russian military action 
during February and March was confined to Crimea.41 However, Russia 
began to shift military attention towards eastern Ukraine as an increasingly 
aggressive group of demonstrators demanded greater union with the Rus-
sian Federation.42 As thousands of Russian soldiers sat at the border, the 
unrest in eastern Ukraine took an ominous turn on April 6 when protestors 
and armed men stormed and occupied key government buildings and 
broadcast facilities in Donetsk, Luhansk, Slovyansk and more than a dozen 
other towns.43 As these groups hoisted Russian flags, the Ukrainian gov-
ernment, the United States and many European nations accused Russia of 
orchestrating the seizure of the buildings and stoking the agitation.44 On 
April 17 Putin, while admitting that the “little green men” who participated 
in the early stages of the Crimea crisis were actually Russian soldiers, de-
nied using similar tactics or personnel in eastern Ukraine stating “that all of 
this is being done by local residents.”45  
Throughout late spring and early summer the intensity and sophistica-
tion of the violence in eastern Ukraine exponentially increased. This was 
highlighted on July 17 when the separatists, using an advanced surface-to-
air missile, shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17 killing all 298 peo-
                                                                                                                      
39. See Steven Lee Myers & Alison Smale, Russian Troops Mass at Border With Ukraine, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/eur 
ope/ukraine.html?_r=1. 
40. See WOEHREL, supra note 27, at 2.  
41. See Myers & Smale, supra note 39. 
42. See WOEHREL, supra note 27, at 2.  
43. Id.  
44. See Kathy Lally, Putin’s Remarks Raise Fears of Future Moves Against Ukraine, 
WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-ch 
anges-course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c 
617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html. 
45. See id. But see Bojan Pancevski, Putin’s 300 Whip Up Ukrainian Turmoil, THE 
SUNDAY TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world 
_news/Ukraine/article1404493.ece (“Russia has been accused of carrying out an ‘invasion 
from within’ of Ukraine using 300 elite special operatives, many of them from its feared 
GRU military intelligence service.”). 
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ple on board.46 The separatists’ access to self-propelled artillery, tanks and 
other heavy weaponry,47 coupled with numerous reports of Russian sol-
diers moving within Ukraine,48 led NATO Supreme Commander General 
Philip Breedlove to state he “believed Russia is playing a leading role in the 
activities of the armed separatist groups in eastern Ukraine.”49 The U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey R. Pyatt, went further in a tweet on Au-
gust 28, saying that Russian forces were fighting in eastern Ukraine in sup-
port of the separatists.50 Russia, in responding to the accusations, denied 
participating in the conflict, but did not refute separatist claims “that up to 
4,000 Russians, including active-duty soldiers currently on leave, had been 
fighting against Ukrainian government forces.”51 
On September 5 the Ukrainian government and the separatists agreed 
to a ceasefire plan that was to be monitored by the Organization for Securi-
ty and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).52 However, the ceasefire was im-
                                                                                                                      
46. See Margaret Coker, Lukas I. Alpert & Robin Van Daalen, Investigators Reach Site of 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 Crash: Ukraine Declared One-Day Pause in Fighting Around MH17 
Area, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 31, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-
declares-one-day-pause-in-fighting-around-mh17-crash-site-1406799743. 
47. See William Mauldin, U.S. Imposes Sanctions, Renews Concerns Over Russian Forces Near 
Ukraine, WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 20, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-adds-
ukrainian-separatists-to-sanctions-list-1403277646 (noting that Ukraine accused the 
Russians of supplying separatists with tanks and other advanced weaponry). 
48. See Neil MacFarquhar & Michael R. Gordon, Ukraine Leader Says “Huge Loads of 
Arms” Pour in From Russia, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.ny 
times.com/2014/08/29/world/europe/ukraine-conflict.html. 
49. WOEHREL, supra note 27, at 2.  
50. See MacFarquhar & Gordon, supra note 48. 
51. Id. (“That assertion evaded the issue of direct Russian involvement by painting the 
soldiers as volunteers. It suggests, however, that Moscow still seeks to organize and to 
some extent control a force that could be operated at arm’s length with a backbone of 
local participation.”). See also Alexander Warkentin, Disowned and Forgotten: Russian Soldiers in 
Ukraine, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.dw.de/disowned-and-forgotten-
russian-soldiers-in-ukraine/a-17888902 (quoting Lev Schlosberg, representative of the 
deputy assembly for the Pskov district in northwest Russia, as saying “[t]he community 
must know what’s really happening. . . . [T]he civil authorities as well as the defense 
ministry are not telling the truth. . . . There is enough evidence that regular Russian 
troops—disguised as units of self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk—are 
taking part in the fighting in Ukraine.”). 
52. See Ukraine, Pro-Russia Separatist Rebels Sign Ceasefire, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 5, 
2014), http://www.dw.de/ukraine-pro-russia-separatist-rebels-sign-ceasefire/a-17904239. 
The plan, among other things, allowed for a prisoner exchange and amnesty for those who 
voluntarily disarmed and had not committed serious crimes. See Neil MacFarquhar, 
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mediately ignored as the separatists refused to disarm or abandon disputed 
areas to the Ukrainian government.53 Fierce fighting around the Donetsk 
airport on September 12 starkly illustrated the ineffectiveness of the cease-
fire,54 and by November 20 casualties from combat operations approached 
one thousand since the signing of the agreement.55 All pretenses of a truce 
had disappeared by January 22, 2015 when “an artillery shell hit a bus stop-
ping for passengers in . . . Donetsk” killing multiple civilians,56 and contin-
uous combat between Ukrainian forces and the separatists became the 
norm.57 The significant increase in violence prompted a second ceasefire to 
go into effect on February 15.58 While Russia and Western powers continue 
to argue over responsibility for the conflict, the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights reports that since the beginning of the 
violence over five thousand people have been killed, approximately eleven 
thousand wounded and hundreds of thousands displaced.59  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
Ukraine Deal Imposes Truce Putin Devised, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/europe/ukraine-cease-fire.html?_r=0. 
53. See Volodymyr Verbyany & Ilya Arkhipov, Ukraine Truce Wobbles as Poroshenko 
Visits Frontline City, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2014-09-06/ukraine-sees-cease-fire-holding-as-russian-troops-poised. 
54. See Ledyard King, Ukraine Fends Off Rebel Attack Near Donetsk Airport, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/09/13/ukraine-
state-of-war/15574715/. The fighting prompted Ukraine Prime Minister Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk’s to state, “[t]his government is the wartime government. And let me put it 
bluntly—we are still in the state of war and the key aggressor is the Russian Federation.” 
Id. 
55. See Almost 1,000 Dead Since East Ukraine Truce—UN, BBC (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30126207. 
56. Death Toll in Ukraine Conflict Exceeds 5,000, May be “Considerably higher”—UN, UN 
NEWS CENTRE (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsId 
=49882#.VMmNPSxKpuV. 
57. See Lucy Westcott, Ukraine Deaths Top 5,000 After Week of Violence, NEWSWEEK 
(Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-deaths-top-5000-after-week-violence-
301675 (noting that the surge in violence between the Ukrainian government and 
separatists was the most violent since the September 5 ceasefire). 
58. See, e.g., Andrey Ostroukh, Gregory L. White & Julian E. Barnes, Doubt Clouds 
Ukraine Truce, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 13, 2015, at A1. 
59. Death Toll in Ukraine Conflict Exceeds 5,000, May be “Considerably higher”—UN, supra 
note 56. This is a conservative number with deaths, injuries and displacement most likely 
significantly higher than reported. See id. 
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III.   WHAT TYPE OF CONFLICT EXISTS IN UKRAINE? 
 
The stealth occupation of Crimea, coupled with the Russian involvement 
with the separatists, makes characterizing the Ukraine conflict extraordinar-
ily difficult.60 To accurately classify the hostilities requires recognizing that 
in both factual and legal terms the occupation and the civil war are separate 
co-existing conflicts taking place within Ukraine.61 
 
A. Applicable Law 
 
Before addressing the specific circumstances of the armed violence in 
Ukraine, it is helpful to briefly consider how conflicts are classified under 
the law of armed conflict. Prior to 1949, the law of armed conflict or jus in 
bello—somewhat self-evidently—applied during time of war.62 It was gener-
                                                                                                                      
60. See, e.g., MacFarquhar, supra note 52 (“Kiev and the West have accused Moscow of 
destabilizing the country, first with a stealth invasion and annexation of Crimea and then 
by inspiring and covertly arming the rebels in southeastern Ukraine.”); Sohrab Ahmari, The 
Weekend Interview: The View From NATO’s Russian Front, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 6, 
2015) (quoting Lieutenant General Frederick Hodges, commander of United States Army 
Europe, as calling the conflict in Ukraine “hybrid warfare”). 
61. Parallel armed conflicts simultaneously taking place within a single State is not 
novel; it has been recognized by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua. See 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
¶ 219 (June 27) (finding that both an international and non-international conflict were 
simultaneously taking place in Nicaragua) [hereineafter Nicaragua]. See also James Summers, 
Introduction, in CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF WAR: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF PROFESSOR PETER ROWE 10 (Caroline Harvey, James Summers & Nigel D. White eds., 
2014) (noting that a simultaneous international and non-international armed conflict was 
found to exist in Nicaragua as there were hostilities “between the Nicaraguan government 
and the Contra rebels within the country and external intervention by the USA”). The 
International Criminal Court (ICC) came to a similar conclusion in the Uganda case. See 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment, ¶¶ 
563–67 (Mar. 14, 2012). The ICC opinion is particularly relevant as it found “that, while 
Uganda’s occupation of Bunia airport in the Democratic Republic of the Congo created 
an international armed conflict, th[ere] existed along-side a separate non-international con-
flict involving rebel groups in the region.” Id. 
62. See GEOFFREY S. CORN, VICTOR HANSEN, RICHARD B. JACKSON, CHRIS JENKS, 
ERIC TALBOT JENSEN & JAMES A. SCHOETTLER JR., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN 
OPERATIONAL APPROACH 67 (2012). As noted by the authors, the application of the law 
of war was not a function of a positive rule. That is, treaties like the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions, as well as the 1929 Geneva Conventions, do not specifically define the 
circumstances that trigger their application. Of course, the question then becomes what is 
meant by war. Again, the authors note that war, for the purpose of international law, was 
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ally agreed that this meant regularly declared international war with recog-
nition on both sides that a state of war existed between the belligerent par-
ties.63 The greater context, of course, was that international law was fo-
cused on the relationship between States and did not regulate matters with-
in the domestic jurisdiction of States.64 Early law of armed conflict accords, 
such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1929 Geneva 
Conventions, did not define the specific circumstances triggering their ap-
plication. Jean Pictet, in his Commentary to the First Geneva Convention, 
highlighted the problem with the historical methodology: 
 
[t]here have been too many cases where the contested legitimacy of the 
enemy Government, or the temporary disappearances of sovereign States 
as a result of annexation or capitulation, had been invoked as pretexts for 
not observing one or other of the Conventions. The need for a remedy to 
this state of affairs had become urgent.65  
  
The remedy came in the form of Common Articles 2 and 3 to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, which trigger the application of the Conventions to 
international and non-international armed conflicts, respectively.66 Com-
mon Article 2 provides that the Conventions shall apply to all cases of de-
clared war, international armed conflict and partial or total occupation.67 In 
                                                                                                                      
defined by renown publicist Lassa Oppenheim as “a contention between two or more 
States through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and 
imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases.” Id. at 3 (citing 2 LASSA 
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). 
63. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 28 (Jean 
Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter GC I COMMENTARY]. 
64. See Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 32, 33. 
As noted by the author, civil wars were not real wars. Such conflicts could be regulated by 
the law of armed conflict in the situation where there was a recognition either by the State 
involved in the conflict or by a third-party State of the belligerency of the insurgent group. 
See id. 
65. See GC I COMMENTARY, supra note 63, at 28. 
66. Common Articles 2 and 3 are today understood as establishing the trigger for the 
application of treaty and customary international law related to their respective category of 
armed conflict. See CORN, HANSEN, JACKSON, JENKS, JENSEN & SCHOETTLER, supra note 
62, at 74. 
67. See, e.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter GC I]. 
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a so-called Common Article 2 armed conflict, all four of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions apply.68 Accordingly, from 1949 onwards, the broader and 
more flexible notion of international armed conflict69 replaced the concept 
of “war” as a primary triggering mechanism for the law of armed conflict.70  
Of particular note to the Ukraine conflict is the categorization of a total 
or partial occupation of enemy territory as an international armed conflict 
under Common Article 2.71 During international armed conflicts, belliger-
ent parties often penetrate, and, if possible, take possession of enemy terri-
tory.72 These “occupations” are conceived of as a temporary state of affairs 
existing until the parties to the conflict execute a peace accord.73 However, 
an occupation does not have to be the result of actual fighting between the 
parties to a conflict.74 History is replete with examples where an occupation 
occurred as a result of a threat to use force by the occupying power against 
                                                                                                                      
68. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, whose provisions 
supplement the 1949 conventions, also applies for those States that have ratified it. 
69. In terms of triggering an international armed conflict, the intensity and duration 
of the fighting is not controlling in terms of the characterization of the armed conflict. 
The application is triggered by two or more States using their armed forces against each 
other. See International Committee of the Red Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” 
Defined in International Humaniatrian Law? 1 (Opinion Paper, 2008), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
70. 1 MARCO SASSÓLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 
108 (2d ed. 2006). The drafters obviously sought to break down the previous formalistic 
barriers tied to a declaration or state of war and have the protections of the conventions 
linked to the facts on the ground, with correspondingly broad based application. 
71. See GC I, supra note 67, art. 2. Occupations and conflicts under Article 1(4) of 
Additional Protocol I are regulated by the law governing international armed conflicts. AP 
I, supra note 8, art. 1(4). 
72. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION 1 (2009). 
73. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation, in DETENTION 
AND OCCUPATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 197 (Michael N. Schmitt & 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg eds., 2012). 
74. As to the case of partial or total occupation, Common Article 2 states that an 
occupation occurs even if it meets no armed resistance. The reference to a lack of armed 
resistance was intended to cover situations similar to the German annexation of 
Czechoslovakia prior to World War II. GC I, supra note 67, art. 2. See also DINSTEIN, 
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 72, at 35; Occupation and International Humanitarian 
Law: Questions and Answers, ICRC (Apr. 4, 2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resour 
ces/documents/misc/634kfc.htm (“[F]or the applicability of the law of occupation, it 
makes no difference whether an occupation has received Security Council approval, what 
its aim is, or indeed whether it is called an ‘invasion,’ ‘liberation,’ administration’ or 
‘occupation.’ . . . [It] is solely the facts on the ground that determines its application.”). 
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the occupied country.75 “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends on-
ly to the territory where such authority has been established and can be ex-
ercised.”76 In an effective occupation, therefore, the occupied power is ren-
dered incapable of exercising its governmental authority over the occupied 
territory, and the occupying power substitutes its own authority for it.77 
Occupation law78 applies from the moment an occupying power effectively 
controls all or part of their enemy’s territory.79 Most importantly, it is this 
body of law that determines the rights and obligations of occupying and 
occupied powers.80  
For those armed conflicts “not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of a state,” such as an internal civil war between a State and 
a non-State armed group,81 the applicable law is described in Common Ar-
ticle 3. The application of the law of armed conflict to non-international 
armed conflicts through the implementation of Common Article 3 marked 
one of the important innovations in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Called 
                                                                                                                      
75. See, e.g., EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3 (1993); 
Akande, supra note 64, at 44. 
76. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, annexed 
to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
77. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 213 (1959). 
78. Occupation law is found in the law of armed conflict and particularly in Hague 
Regulations, supra note 76, arts. 42–56; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 47–78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287; AP I, supra note 8, arts. 63, 69, 72–92; and customary international law. 
79. George Packer, Occupation, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0, at 307, 308 (Roy Gutman, 
David Rieff & Anthony Dworkin eds., 2007). 
80. Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 270, 270 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
81. “Armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of the 
High Contracting Parties” is defined as a non-international armed conflict. See, e.g., GC I, 
supra note 67, art. 3. “Non-international armed conflict generally arises, as the ICTY 
[International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] noted, ‘within a state,’ 
although the conflict need not unfold, at least entirely, within one state’s geographic 
borders.” HELEN DUFFY, THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (2005). The Statute of the International Criminal Court 
describes a non-international armed conflict as one that takes place in the territory of a 
State when there is protracted armed conflict between government authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups. Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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a “convention in miniature,”82 Common Article 3, along with Additional 
Protocol II,83 is the primary source of international law in an internal armed 
conflict.84 The international law regulating an internal armed conflict, while 
providing baseline humanitarian obligations, is far less developed than the 
law regulating international armed conflicts.85 This is primarily due to the 
internal nature of these conflicts and the continuing applicability of domes-
tic law to the hostilities.   
Determining when a non-international armed conflict exists versus a 
mere “internal disturbance,” such as riots or “isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence,” is often complicated and subjective.86 Similar to their intent with 
regard to international armed conflicts, the drafters of the Geneva Conven-
tions wanted the scope of application for non-international armed conflicts 
to “be as wide as possible” to ensure “respect for certain rules” which are 
                                                                                                                      
82. See COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT 
OF PRISONERS OF WAR 34 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter GC III COMMENTARY] 
(“Article 3 is like a ‘Convention in miniature.’ It applies to non-international conflicts only, 
and will be the only Article applicable to them until . . . a special agreement between the 
Parties has brought into force between them all or part of the other provisions of the 
Convention.”). 
83. Additional Protocol II supplements “Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions,” but limits the applicability of the law to only those situations where 
“dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups” which are “under responsible 
command” exercise “control over a part” a State. AP II, supra note 9, art. 1. These formal 
conditions for applicability are in contrast to the vague and non-binding criteria set forth 
in the commentaries to the Geneva Conventions. See infra note 88. They are the basis of 
one of the objections the United States has to Additional Protocol II.  
84. There are a number of other law of armed conflict treaties addressing non-
international armed conflict. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 81, art. 8(2)(c), 8(2)(e); 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317. 
Moreover, customary international law provides more robust regulation of non-
international armed conflict. See Akande, supra note 64, at 33. 
85. See, e.g., Sean Watts, Present and Future Conceptions of the Status of Government Forces in 
Non-International Armed Conflict, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 145, 148–49 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) 
(Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies) (stating “in purely 
quantitative terms, the positive law of NIAC pales in comparison to the law-of-war 
provisions applicable to conflicts between States”). This is true despite the overwhelming 
majority of armed conflicts since 1945 being characterized as non-international. See 
LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2002).  
86. See AP II, supra note 9, art. 1(2). 
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“essential in all civilized countries.”87 As a result, there are no universally 
accepted conditions to objectively distinguish between an internal disturb-
ance and a non-international armed conflict, though there are a number of 
criteria that may indicate the difference between a domestic police action 
and a civil war.88 In those situations where an armed disturbance does not 
reach the level of a “conflict” domestic law applies and international hu-
manitarian law is generally irrelevant.89  
On the other end of the spectrum is the question of when an internal 
armed conflict may become internationalized. As outlined in the Tadić 
opinion,90 and later adopted by the ICC in its Lubanga decision,91 a non-
international armed conflict can ripen into an international armed conflict 
if a State sufficiently controls guerillas participating in a civil war. The 
amount of control a State must have over a rebel group to internationalize 
a non-international armed conflict is a point of controversy in international 
law.92 However, the Tadić opinion sets forth the “overall control” test for 
determining when guerilla forces are sufficiently controlled by a State actor 
                                                                                                                      
87. See GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 82, at 36–37 (“No Government can object 
to observing, in its dealings with enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict between it 
and them, a few essential rules . . . .”). 
88. The commentaries to the Geneva Conventions give a list of non-binding criteria 
that include: the non-State armed group is an organized military force, under responsible 
command, with control of territory and respects the law of armed conflict, and the State 
actor responds with its regular armed forces. See, e.g., GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 82, 
at 36. The Rome Statute of the ICC describes a non-international armed conflict as one 
that takes place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between 
government authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups. Rome 
Statute, supra note 81, art. 8(2)(f). Others have stated that the two primary criteria for 
applicability are that the rebel forces must display a minimum level of organization and the 
fighting must present a minimum of intensity. See, e.g., ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 78 (2008). 
89. International Committee of the Red Cross, What is International Humanitarian Law? 
(2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (stating “[i]nter-
national humanitarian law applies only to [international or non-international] armed con-
flict; it does not cover internal tensions or disturbances such as isolated acts of violence. 
The law applies only once a conflict has begun, and then equally to all sides regardless of 
who started the fighting.”). 
90. Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 137. 
91. Lubanga, supra note 61, ¶ 211 (adopting the “overall control” test asserted in the 
Tadić opinion). 
92. For a more in-depth analysis, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND 
SELF-DEFENCE 221–24 (5th ed. 2011). 
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to internationalize a civil war.93 Merely providing “assistance to rebels in 
the form of the provision of weapons or logistical support” does not 
necessarily create an international armed conflict.94 This gap allows a State 
providing assistance to a rebel group “some elbow room before its action is 
considered to be crossing” the threshold into an international armed 
conflict.95  
Classifying a conflict is a necessity for determining whether the law of 
armed conflict is applicable and, if so, the scope of that application.96 
Again, it is possible to have multiple types of conflicts taking place simul-
taneously within one State.97 So what is the appropriate conflict classifica-
tion for Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the hostilities in eastern Ukraine?98  
 
B. Occupation of Crimea 
 
As discussed in the background section, in late February and early March 
of 2014 Russian troops took control of the Crimean peninsula, located on 
Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, in a bloodless, or near bloodless, military takeo-
ver. Russian Federation control of Crimea began when unidentifiable sol-
diers, colloquially called “little green men” by the local population, but later 
confirmed to be members of the Russian Special Forces (Spetsnaz),99 
stormed the Crimean parliament.100 Simultaneous with this special opera-
                                                                                                                      
93. Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 137. 
94. Nicaragua, supra note 61, ¶ 195. 
95. See Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks on Non-International Armed Conflicts, in 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 
85, at 399, 411. 
96. See id.  
97. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 54 (2012) (stating “the fact 
that a particular class of conflict is taking place in one part of a country does not 
presuppose that a similar class of conflict is taking place in another part”). 
98. See Baczynska, Polityuk & Kasolowsky, supra note 26 (discussing the ongoing 
conflicts in Crimea and eastern Ukraine).  
99. Shevchenko, supra note 1.  
100. See Harriet Salem, Shaun Walker & Luke Harding, Crimean Parliament Seized by 
Unknown Pro-Russian Gunmen, THE GUARDIAN (Feb 27, 2014), http://www.theguardia 
n.com/world/2014/feb/27/crimean-parliament-seized-by-unknown-pro-russian-gunmen. 
According to President Putin, the “little green men” were members of self-defense groups 
organized by the locals who bought all their uniforms and hardware in commercial shops, 
notwithstanding the fact that their guns were the same as those used by the Russian army, 
their lorries had Russian number plates and they spoke in Russian accents. See 
Shevchenko, supra note 1. Despite these claims it is well-established that the unknown 
gunmen were part of the Russian special forces. See supra text accompanying note 44–45. 
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tion, Russian regular armed forces blockaded Ukrainian military installa-
tions in order to facilitate their seizure of airports, government buildings, 
ports and broadcasters.101 The mobilization of the Russian armed forces 
within Crimea was relatively easy as stationing agreements executed be-
tween Russia and Ukraine allowed for a significant presence of Russian 
Federation forces in the peninsula.102 Specifically, these agreements provid-
ed Russia with long-term leases for over one thousand naval facilities,103 
two airfields and a training facility on the Crimean peninsula.104 Reports put 
the Russian military presence in Crimea before the takeover at approxi-
mately 25,000 personnel, 22 airplanes, 24 artillery complexes, and 132 ar-
mored trucks.105  
Within a week after the seizure of the parliament, senior U.S. admin-
istration officials estimated Russian ground and naval forces had complete 
operational control over the entire Crimean peninsula.106 Russian posses-
sion of all key governmental locations and infrastructure supported this 
assessment.107 Despite a few incidents, such as on March 8, 2014 when 
warning shots were fired by Russian forces to prevent an OSCE unarmed 
observer mission from entering the peninsula,108 Russian control of Crimea 
occurred with minimal violence. The formal annexation of Crimea by the 
Russian Federation on March 21, 2014 officially displaced the Ukrainian 
                                                                                                                      
101. See Ukraine: The End of the Beginning?, THE ECONOMIST (May 8, 2014), http://ww 
w.economist.com/news/briefing/21598744-having-occupied-crimea-russia-stirring-up-tro 
uble-eastern-ukraine-end. 
102. See Russia Allowed to have 25,000 Troops in Crimea Since 1999... & Other Facts you 
May Not Know, ECONOMICPOLICYJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.economic 
policyjournal.com/2014/03/russia-allowed-to-have-25000-troops-in.html.  
103. The most significant naval force in Crimea is the Russian Black Sea Fleet at the 
port of Sevastopol. See Robert McMahon, Ukraine in Crisis, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Aug. 25, 2014). 
104. See Anna Arutunyan, Russia’s Possible Undercover Military Intervention, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/15/russias-pos 
sible-undercover-military-intervention/6464433/.  
105. Id.  
106. See Elizabeth Landau, Diana Magnay & Ben Wedeman, In Russia’s “Low-key” 
Invasion of Crimea, the Fight is Over Information, CNN (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.cnn. 
com/2014/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-crimea/index.html.  
107. See Uri Friedman, Putin’s Playbook: The Strategy Behind Russia’s Takeover of Crimea, 
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/20 
14/03/putins-playbook-the-strategy-behind-russias-takeover-of-crimea/284154/. 
108. See Baczynska, Polityuk & Kasolowsky, supra note 26. 
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government as the sovereign power, while solidifying Russian control of 
the peninsula.109  
Given the above circumstances, even though the occupation was 
“bloodless,” the fact that it was coercive and non-consensual marks it as a 
belligerent occupation.110 Therefore, a partial belligerent occupation of the 
Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation exists and has most certainly 
implicated the Common Article 2 trigger.111 As “military occupation is a 
matter of fact,”112 the Russian Federation has clearly displaced the Ukraini-
an government as the governmental authority in Crimea through a military 
invasion.113 Russian attempts to evade responsibility are simply irrelevant.114 
Occupation is triggered by “conditions on the ground that cannot be dis-
missed by politics or propaganda.”115 Thus the legal status of Crimea re-
mains unaltered by the Russian annexation.116 Consequently, a Russian oc-
cupation of Crimea currently exists triggering all applicable international 
law.117  
                                                                                                                      
109. Id. 
110. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing the low threshold 
required for the triggering of occupation law). 
111. Arguably, one of the most important principles underlying the portion of the law 
of armed conflict related to belligerent occupation is that the occupying power does not 
acquire sovereign rights over the occupied territory. Rather, the occupying State exercises 
only provisional and temporary powers through the administration of the occupied 
territory.  
112. Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 355 (1956). 
113. See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 72, at 38 (stating that an 
occupation exists when “the contested area is solidly seized by the invader, and the 
sovereign is actually displaced”). 
114. See the Hostages Case. United States v. List (Case No. 7), 8 LRTWC 34 (Military 
Tribunal V, 1948), in 11 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law No. 10, at 757, 1243 (1951) (“Whether an invasion has 
developed into an occupation is a question of fact. The term invasion implies a military 
operation while an occupation indicates the exercise of governmental authority to the 
exclusion of the established government.”). 
115. Marc Warren, Belligerent Occupation, in U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE LAW 
(Geoffrey S. Corn, Shane R. Reeves & Rachael Vanlandingham eds.) (forthcoming 2015). 
116. On the issue of annexation and occupation of Crimea, see Robin Geiss, Russia’s 
Annexation of Crimea: The Mills of International Law Grind Slowly but They Do Grind, 91 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 425 (2015). 
117. The corpus of the positive law of belligerent occupation can be found in specific 
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as supplemented by Additional Protocol I 
and the Hague Declarations and Conventions of 1899 and 1907. See DANIEL THURER, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE AND CONTEXT 148–49 
(2011). 
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C. Civil War in Eastern Ukraine 
 
The scuttling of the trade agreement with the EU by then-President Yanu-
kovych in November 2013 started an upward spiral of violence in 
Ukraine.118 By July 2014 the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) had characterized the violence in eastern Ukraine as a non-
international armed conflict.119 Although this determination is non-binding, 
the ICRC’s statement is firmly grounded in the law of armed conflict. By 
any criteria the violence in eastern Ukraine long ago passed the threshold 
from internal disturbance to non-international armed conflict. The sepa-
ratists are an organized armed group120 in control of significant territory 
who are engaged in a protracted armed conflict with the Ukrainian mili-
tary.121 The intensity of the violence has continually—and often dramatical-
ly—increased since the summer of 2014, with casualties mounting for both 
the Ukrainian military forces and the separatists.122 Regardless of whether 
the non-binding criteria found in the commentaries to the Geneva Con-
ventions, or the more restrictive test established in international jurispru-
dence, is applied to the circumstances in eastern Ukraine, the existence of a 
non-international armed conflict is indisputable.123  
The more difficult conflict classification question is whether the rela-
tionship between the Russian Federation and the pro-Russian separatists 
has internationalized the internal armed conflict. Determining that the 
                                                                                                                      
118. See Antonia Mortensen, Ukraine Protests: 5 Things you Need to Know, CNN (Feb. 19, 
2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/13/business/ukraine-protests-explainer/. It is 
believed that Russia threatened Ukraine with trade sanctions if it signed the deal with the 
EU. 
119. See Ukraine: ICRC Calls on All Sides to Respect International Humanitarian Law, ICRC 
(July 23, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/07-
23-ukraine-kiev-call-respect-ihl-repatriate-bodies-malaysian-airlines.htm. 
120. See infra text accompanying notes 233–35 (explaining why the separatists meet 
the criteria to be an organized armed group). 
121. See, e.g., Ostroukh, White & Barnes, supra note 58, at A1. In discussing the 
February 15, 2015 peace agreement, the authors quote Alexander Zakharchenko, the head 
of the separatists self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic. Id. The peace agreement 
recognizes that the separatists are in control of significant territory in eastern Ukraine and 
outlines the obligations of the Ukrainian military and the separatists. Id. 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 54–59. 
123. Compare GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 82, at 36, with Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 
70, and Rome Statute, supra note 81, art. 8(2)(f). See also supra text accompanying notes 87–
89 (discussing the various approaches to characterizing a non-international armed 
conflict). 
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Ukraine civil war qualifies as an international armed conflict is dependent 
upon whether Russia sufficiently controls the separatists. In particular, the 
question is whether they have overall control over the separatists.124 
Russia is, undoubtedly, involved in the ongoing Ukraine civil war. 
Though they consistently deny these accusations,125 there is overwhelming 
evidence showing the Russians actively equipping, training and even 
fighting alongside the separatists in eastern Ukraine.126 Yet it is difficult to 
determine the full extent and scope of their control of the separatists, as 
the Russian-backed rebels are seemingly independent actors.127 Without 
more evidence to clarify the Russian-separatist relationship, it is not known 
whether Russia is exercising a sufficiently high level of control over the 
separatists to internationalize the well-established non-international armed 
conflict.128 Given this challenge and because of the overwhelming evidence 
supporting the existence of a non-international armed conflict, this article 
considers the situation in eastern Ukraine to qualify as the latter. However, 
as more advanced Russian weaponry and Russian soldiers pour over the 
border, it is becoming more difficult to posit that the hostilities are truly 
internal to Ukraine.129 
                                                                                                                      
124. Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 137. 
125. See Alan Cullison & Philip Shishkin, Ukrainians, Skeptical of Truce, Vow to Rearm, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 13, 2015, at A6 (“Moscow denies sending troops or armor 
into Ukraine.”). 
126. See, e.g., Ahmari, supra note 60, (noting that the commander of United States 
Army Europe has said that the separatists have advanced weaponry that only could come 
from Russia); Cullison & Shishkin, supra note 125 (“In Kiev, a Ukrainian military 
spokesman said that around 50 tanks, 40 missile systems and 40 armored vehicles crossed 
into Ukraine.”). See also supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing the number of 
Russian soldiers fighting in the Ukrainian civil war). 
127. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 46–50 (discussing the separatist action of 
shooting down Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17). 
128. But see Robert Heinsch, Conflict Classification in Ukraine: The Return of the “Proxy 
War”?, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 323, 354–60 (2015) (“The ICTY’s jurisprudence 
adopting the overall control standard has clarified the circumstances in which the 
internationalization of a noninternational conflict may be found to have occurred. While 
greater clarity of information would be desirable, it seems likely that the situation in 
eastern Ukraine can be qualified as an internationalized non-international armed conflict, 
i.e., an original non-international armed conflict, which, through the indirect influence of 
Russia and the support it is providing to, and control it is exercising over, the pro-Russian 
separatists, has become an international armed conflict.”). 
129. See, e.g., Laura Smith-Spark & Nic Robertson, Is Peace Possible in Ukraine? Key 
Leaders Meet to Find Out, CNN (Feb. 11, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/ 
02/11/europe/ukraine-conflict/ (accusing Russia of sending heavy weaponry and soldiers 
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The occupation of Crimea and the non-international armed conflict in 
eastern Ukraine, though inextricably linked, remain best viewed as parallel 
international and non-international armed conflicts. 
 
IV.   STATUS CLASSIFICATION AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
The conflict classification paradigm proposed above allows for battlefield 
status determinations for those participating in the Ukraine hostilities.130 To 
analyze the status of each of the primary participants in the Ukraine con-
flict, it is first important to understand how individuals are generally classi-
fied under the law of armed conflict. 
 It must be emphasized, as a preliminary matter, that questions concern-
ing which State is responsible for the Ukraine hostilities have no effect on 
the rights and obligations of those participating in the hostilities.131 Once a 
State is in a “period of war, international armed conflict, or occupation” 
responsibilities and protections become universal for participants132 and 
“the politics of deciding who has breached that law [prohibiting the use of 
                                                                                                                      
into Ukraine). See also Michael R. Gordon, Armed With Google and YouTube, Analysts Gauge 
Russia’s Presence in Ukraine, NEW YORK TIMES, May 27, 2015, at A6 (“An unusual 
investigation using publicly available videos, smartphone photographs and satellite images 
shows that Russia is continuing to defy the West by conducting protracted military 
operations inside Ukraine . . . .”). 
130. GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW IN WAR 149 (2010). The law of armed conflict provides a sophisticated regulatory 
regime, in terms of both positive and customary law, that classifies individuals based upon 
their group status and/or individual conduct during armed conflicts with significant 
practical and policy consequences flowing from such determinations. See id. 
131. It is important to maintain the bifurcation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In 
an article in the International Review of the Red Cross, Kolb describes the difference between 
these two areas of the law by stating, “[j]us ad bellum refers to the conditions under which 
one may resort to war or to force in general; jus in bello governs the conduct of belligerents 
during a war, and in a broader sense comprises the rights and obligations of neutral parties 
as well.” Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello, 320 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 553, 553 n.1 (1997), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnuu.htm.  
132. Brian J. Bill, Human Rights: Time for Greater Judge Advocate Understanding, THE ARMY 
LAWYER 54, 58 (June 2010). For a more in-depth discussion of jus in bello, see Shane R. 
Reeves & David Lai, A Broad Overview of the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, in THE 
FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 142 (Lynne Zusman ed., 2014). 
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force] should not have a bearing on the protection of war victims.”133 It is 
the jus in bello, “predicated on the postulate of equal application of its legal 
norms to all Parties to the conflict,”134 alone that regulates the conduct of 
the participants.135 Violations or breaches of this specialized area of interna-
tional law “cannot be justified on the ground that the enemy is responsible 
for commencing the hostilities in flagrant breach of the jus ad bellum.”136 
Jus in bello is built upon the “fundamental” and “intransgressible” prin-
ciple of distinction.137 Additional Protocol I Article 48, which is reflective 
of customary international law,138 provides: 
 
[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population 
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian ob-
jects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations 
only against military objectives.139 
 
The preamble to the highly influential St. Petersburg Declaration em-
phasizes that war is to be waged against the armed forces of the enemy and 
not against the civilian population.140 Accordingly, in international armed 
conflicts individuals are divided into two broad categories—combatants 
and civilians—which are mutually exclusive and absolutely complemen-
tary.141 A third category, albeit not expressed in the law of armed conflict, is 
that of “unlawful combatant,” which is “a short hand expression . . . de-
                                                                                                                      
133. Andrew J. Carswell, Classifying the Conflict: A Soldier’s Dilemma, 91 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 143, 152 (2009), available at http://www. 
icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review/review-873-p143.htm. 
134. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 4 (2004). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 4–5. 
137. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 78, 79 (July 8). 
138. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 3–25 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL RULES]. 
139. AP I, supra note 8, art. 48. 
140. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 7 (2d ed. 2004). See also St. 
Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Times of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/decpeter.asp.  
141. Nils Melzer, The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 296 (Andrew 
Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014). 
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scribing those who take up arms without being authorized to do so by in-
ternational law.”142 Understanding the general parameters of these status 
categorizations is a necessity in order to comply with the principle of dis-
tinction.143  
 
A.  Combatants 
 
Combatants are those individuals who “have the right to participate d i-
rectly in hostilities.”144 This status, which only exists in an international 
armed conflict,145 applies to most members of the armed forces146 and to 
certain individuals who take an active part in hostilities regardless of their 
membership in an armed force.147 More specifically, combatants include the 
regular armed forces of a State party to the conflict;148 members of militia, 
volunteer corps and organized resistance movements that are under re-
sponsible command, have a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a dis-
tance, carry their arms openly and conduct their operations in accordance 
with the laws of war;149 members of a regular armed force who profess 
                                                                                                                      
142. SOLIS, supra note 130, at 208. 
143. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1863 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski 
& Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter AP I COMMENTARY]. 
144. AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2). 
145. CIHL RULES, supra note 138, r. 3. 
146. Medical and religious personnel, though members of the armed forces, are 
considered noncombatants. SOLIS, supra note 130, at 191–94. 
147. Yoram Dinstein, Unlawful Combatancy, in 2 THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 227, 227 (Michael N. Schmitt & Wolff Heintschel 
von Heinegg eds., 2012). 
148. “The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups, and units which are under a command responsible to that party for the 
conduct of its subordinates.” CIHL RULES, supra note 138, r. 3. Additional Protocol I 
words the definition in a slightly different manner. It states, in part, as follows: “Members 
of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains 
covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have 
the right to participate directly in hostilities.” AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2). 
149. See GC III, supra note 8, art. 4(2). See also BOOTHBY, supra note 97, at 142. 
Members of other militias and volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance 
movements, must belong to a party. GC III, supra note 8, art. 4(A)(2). They retain 
combatant status whether they are operating in or outside their own territory, even if this 
territory is occupied, provided they fulfill the requisite conditions. Id. Further, their status 
does not change whether they are assimilated into the armed forces of a party or act as a 
distinct organization as long as they continue to comply with the outlined criteria. 
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their allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the detain-
ing power;150 and those inhabitants of a non-occupied territory that form a 
levée en masse.151 Combatant status is only concerned with the legal right to 
participate in a conflict and not actual conduct during hostilities. As a re-
sult, an individual deemed a combatant is a lawful target who is continu-
ously a “legitimate object of attack . . . as long as they are capable of 
fighting, willing to fight or resist capture.”152 
If captured, a combatant is entitled to the “status of a prisoner of 
war . . . subject to the conditio sine qua non that he is a lawful combatant.”153 
As a prisoner of war, the individual enjoys assimilation rights154 and can 
                                                                                                                      
AP I Article 44(3) allows a belligerent to attain combatant status by carrying his arms 
openly during each military engagement and when visible to an adversary while deploying 
for an attack. The Additional Protocol standard “lowers the threshold for obtaining 
combatant status . . . by eliminating the classic requirement for ‘having a fixed distinctive 
sign recognizable at a distance’ . . . .” INTERNATIONAL & OPERATIONAL LAW 
DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, 
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 17 (2013) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. The United States, 
concerned that the elimination of this requirement undercuts the principle of distinction, 
rejects AP I Article 44(3) as customary law, and maintains the traditional combatant 
requirements outlined in the Geneva Conventions. See id. 
150. This provision is a historic artifact from World War II when certain States 
refused to recognized belligerent combatant units which professed allegiance to a 
government or authority which these States did not recognize. See GC III COMMENTARY, 
supra note 82, at 61. The distinguishing characteristic of this subset of combatant status is 
that, in the view of their adversary, these individuals are no longer operating under the 
direct authority of a party to a conflict. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT 63 (2d ed. 2000). 
151. A levée en masse exists when“[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the 
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without 
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms 
openly and respect the laws and customs of war.” GC III, supra note 8, art. 4(A)(6). For a 
more in-depth discussion of this unique combatant status category, see generally David 
Wallace & Shane R. Reeves, The Law of Armed Conflict’s “Wicked” Problem: Levée en Masse 
in Cyber Warfare, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 646 (2013), http://stock 
ton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=ils.  
152. GREEN, supra note 150, at 124. See also SOLIS, supra note 130, at 188 (“[I]f a 
combatant is home on leave and in uniform, far from the combat zone, and is somehow 
targeted by an opposing combatant, she remains a legitimate target and may be killed—
just as the opposing combatant, if discovered outside the combat zone, may be killed by 
his enemy.”). 
153. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29; Melzer, supra note 
141, at 305. 
154. “POWs are assimilated, for protective purposes, into the armed forces of the 
detaining state. As such, they are entitled to trial before the same courts, and according to 
 
 
 
International Law Studies                                2015 
 
387 
 
 
 
 
 
 
assert combatant privilege from prosecution. This privilege, often called 
“combatant immunity,” shields a prisoner of war from any “criminal re-
sponsibility for killing or injuring enemy military personnel or civilians tak-
ing an active part in hostilities, or for causing damage or destruction to 
property,” provided their actions complied with the law of armed con-
flict.155 Captured combatants are therefore “not . . . regarded as criminals or 
convicts . . . [but] are guarded as a measure of security and not of punish-
ment.”156 If there is any doubt as to whether an individual, having commit-
ted belligerent acts and having fallen into the hands of an enemy is a com-
batant as defined by the categories above, his or her status would be de-
termined by a competent tribunal.157 
 
B. Civilians 
 
The second broad status characterization expressly recognized by the law 
of armed conflict is that of civilian. The term “civilian” is curiously left un-
defined in the positive law and, instead, is outlined under the law applicable 
in international armed conflicts as “any person who does not belong to one 
of the categories of person referred to in Article 4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of 
the Third Geneva Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol.”158 A ci-
vilian is, therefore, defined in the negative as it is any individual who is not 
a member of the armed forces.159 The “protection of civilians is one of the 
main goals” of the law of armed conflict,160 and if there is any doubt about 
                                                                                                                      
the same procedures as member of the regular armed forces of the detaining state.” Derek 
Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1493, 1506 
(2004). 
155. Id. 
156. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Rules of Land Warfare ¶ 60 
(1914). It is “especially forbidden” to “declare that no quarter will be given,” to kill or 
wound “treacherously” an adversary’s armed forces or those who have surrendered. 
Hague Regulations, supra note 76, art. 23. 
157. See GC III, supra note 8, art. 5. Article 5 raises a presumption that individuals 
who might be prisoners of war shall have the Third Geneva Convention applied to them. 
See SOLIS, supra note 130, at 228. 
158. AP I, supra note 8, art. 50(1). 
159. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 143, ¶ 1913. 
160. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE 
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other 
/icrc-002-0990.pdf [hereinafter ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE]. 
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the status of an individual the assumption is they are a civilian.161 Civilian 
status is not absolute and is forfeited “for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities.”162 Thus, if a civilian chooses to take up arms “or partici-
pate[s] actively in hostilities,” they lose benefits associated with their pro-
tected status.163 
Unlike combatant status, civilian status exists in non-international 
armed conflicts as well as in international armed conflicts.164 However, 
where the “protections and obligations of the law of international armed 
conflict are premised almost entirely on the status of affected persons, the 
law of non-international armed conflict spurns such classifications, as well 
as the international armed conflict taxonomy of status-based protection.”165 
As a result, there is a legal difference between those civilians who directly 
participate in an internal armed conflict and those who do not. Some 
scholars have attempted to address this difference by adopting the term 
“fighters” to describe “both members of the regular armed forces fighting 
on behalf of the government and members of armed groups fighting 
against the government.”166 The term is “employed in lieu of ‘combatants’ 
in order to avoid any confusion with the meaning of the latter term in the 
context of the international law of armed conflict,” but does not connote 
lawfulness to participate in the hostilities.167 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
161. See AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 143, at 610. 
162. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(3). 
163. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29–30. 
164. See AP II, supra note 9, art. 13(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded 
by this Part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”). However, a 
civilian’s “activities alone cannot constitute a non-international armed conflict, for such a 
conflict cannot exist without an organized armed group on at least one side. Thus, the 
category of directly participating civilians only has meaning in the context of an ongoing 
non-international armed conflict.” See Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in 
a Non-International Armed Conflict, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 85, at 119, 135. 
165. Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 145, 146 (2012). 
166. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 
¶ 1.1.2 (2006) [hereinafter NIAC MANUAL]. 
167. Id. As noted by the authors of the Manual, the term “fighter” does not appear in 
any binding treaty. 
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C. Unlawful Combatants 
 
The term “unlawful combatant,” also sometimes referred to as “unlawful 
belligerent,” is not a distinct individual battlefield status168 and does “not 
appear in the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols, or any other 
LOAC treaty, convention or protocol.”169 The term is instead descriptive 
for those who unlawfully engage in combat activities by taking a part in 
hostilities “without being entitled to do so.”170 Unlawful combatants may 
include spies and saboteurs,171 mercenaries,172 members of a State armed 
force who abuse their status,173 members of a non-State armed group174 or 
civilians who “directly participate in hostilities.”175 
                                                                                                                      
168. See HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of 
Israel, 62(1) PD 507 [2006] (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373, 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/e16/02007690.e16.htm 
(noting that according to the state of current international law there is no separate 
category for unprivileged belligerents). 
169. SOLIS, supra note 130, at 206–8 (quoting CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of 
Israel, 62(4) PD 329 [2008] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/ 
06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.htm).  
170. Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” 85 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 45 (2003), available at https:/ 
/www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_849_dorman.pdf. 
171. See Hague Regulations, supra note 76, arts. 29–31; AP I, supra note 8, art. 46. 
172. See AP I, supra note 8, art. 47 (stating “a mercenary shall not have the right to be 
a combatant or a prisoner of war”). 
173. See DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29 (“[U]nder 
customary international law, a sanction (deprivation of the privileges of a prisoner of war) 
is imposed on any combatant masquerading as a civilian in order to mislead the enemy and 
avoid detection.”). But see AP I, supra note 8, art. 44(4) (“A combatant who falls into the 
power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the requirements [to be a combatant] shall 
forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections 
equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war . . . .”). 
174. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at 32–34. Individuals who 
are members of organized non-State armed groups become unlawful combatants due to 
their “continuous combat function” within the group. “Membership must depend on 
whether the continuous function assumed by an individual corresponds to that collectively 
exercised by the group as a whole, namely conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-State 
party to the conflict.” Id. at 33. Members of non-State armed groups do not have the 
privileges affiliated with combatant status. Id. 
175. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(3). There is much debate concerning what constitutes 
“a direct part in hostilities.” Compare ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at 
5–6 (“The Interpretive Guidance provides a legal reading of the notion of ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’ with a view to strengthening the implementation of the 
principle of distinction.”), with Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups 
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 In international armed conflicts, being categorized as an “unlawful 
combatant” results in a number of adverse consequences. Similar to a 
combatant, an unlawful combatant remains a legitimate target regardless of 
their location or activities.176 However, if captured, an unlawful combatant 
is not afforded prisoner of war protections or any combatant privileges.177 
Without immunity, the individual “may be prosecuted and punished to the 
extent that their activities, their membership, or the harm caused by them is 
penalized under national law,”178 even if “these acts do not constitute war 
crimes under international law.”179 These harsh penalties are intended to 
“simultaneously reward soldiers for being readily identifiable and deter ci-
vilians from entering the fray, thereby keeping the line between combatants 
and civilians as discernible as possible and maximizing civilian safety.”180 
In non-international armed conflicts, civilians who are “fighters” 
against the sovereign government are equated to unlawful combatants. As 
such, they are targetable for the entirety of their membership or their active 
participation181 without any of the privileges of combatant status. Though 
                                                                                                                      
and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 641, 641 (2010), and 
Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A 
Critical Analysis, 1 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 1, 5 (2010) (criticizing the 
Interpretive Guidance recommendations). However, there is agreement that once a civilian 
directly participates in hostilities, his civilian status and protections are suspended and 
consequently “may be attacked in the same manner as identified members of an opposing 
armed force.” HANDBOOK, supra note 149, at 20. 
176. See INTERNATIONAL & OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
DESKBOOK 134 (2010). 
177. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942) (“Lawful combatants are subject to 
capture and detention as prisoners of war,” while “[u]nlawful combatants are likewise 
subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and 
punishment . . . .”). 
178. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at 84. 
179. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 30 (citing ALLAN 
ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 305 (1976) (explaining that 
unlawful combatants “may be punished under the internal criminal legislation of the 
adversary for having committed hostile acts in violation of its provisions (e.g. for murder), 
even if these acts do not constitute war crimes under international law.”). 
180. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ARMED CONFLICT 118 (2005). 
181. See Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 164, at 132. In a non-
international armed conflict the same general rules related to targeting apply as in an 
international armed conflict through the application of customary international law. See 
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international law necessitates humane treatment and fair trials if they are 
captured or are hors de combat,182 there remains a built-in distinction between 
the government forces and those who fight against it.183 “The latter are 
viewed as traitors and, if captured, are liable to be prosecuted and punished 
for violations of domestic law. They cannot be expected to be accorded the 
privileges of prisoners of war status.”184 Civilians who are either a member 
of a non-State armed group or directly participate against government forc-
es in a non-international armed conflict therefore assume significant risk as 
they have greatly diminished protections.  
 
V.   WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE UKRAINE CONFLICT PARTICIPANTS? 
 
As explained in Part III, the Ukraine conflict is both an occupation and a 
non-international armed conflict. By applying the framework outlined in 
Part IV to this conflict characterization, it is possible to determine the indi-
vidual status of those participating in the conflict. These status determina-
tions clarify the legal protections and obligations for each of the primary 
actors and are discussed below. 
 
A.  Russian Regular Forces 
 
On March 21, 2014 Russians celebrated as President Putin, in a nationally 
televised event, signed legislation to “finalize” the annexation of Crimea.185 
Despite these theatrics, the occupation of Crimea continues,186 thus the 
entirety of the law of armed conflict is triggered,187 including certain rights 
and obligations for members of the Russian armed forces.188 As Russian 
                                                                                                                      
Jelena Pejic, Conflict Classification and the Law Applicable to Detention and the Use of Force, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 102. 
182. The overarching requirement of humane treatment, which now reflects 
customary international law, is based upon Common Article 3(1) and Articles 2(1) and 
4(1) of Additional Protocol II. See Pejic, supra note 181. 
183. Yoram Dinstein, The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES148 (Wolff Heintschel 
von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2010).  
184. Id. 
185. See Putin Signs Laws Completing Procedure to Absorb Crimea into Russia, REUTERS 
(Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101488951. 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 27–38, 103–6. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 111–17 (noting that a Russian occupation of 
Crimea currently exists thus triggering all the law of armed conflict). 
188. AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2). 
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soldiers are members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, they 
have “a right to participate directly in [the] hostilities” as combatants.189 
This status applies to all members of the Russian regular armed forces in 
Ukraine except those with protected status, such as medical and religious 
personnel.190 This status imparts the legal right to participate and is uncon-
cerned with conduct; therefore, Russian soldiers are combatants regardless 
of their particular duties.191 Further, whether the Russian soldier is passively 
involved in the occupation of Crimea or heavily engaged in combat opera-
tions to support the separatists in eastern Ukraine is irrelevant to their sta-
tus as a combatant. As the Crimea occupation triggered an international 
armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the rights and duties of com-
batant status apply to the conflict regardless of geographic location.192 
As a combatant, the Russian regular soldier participating in the Ukraine 
conflict has all the protections and obligations associated with that status. 
This includes immunity from “criminal responsibility for killing or injur-
ing” Ukrainian military personnel, civilians taking an active part in hostili-
ties or for causing damage or destruction to property,” provided their ac-
tions comply with the law of armed conflict.193 Conversely, they may “im-
mediately be targeted without any specific conduct” by Ukrainian forces, 
assuming they have not surrendered, been captured or are otherwise hors de 
combat.194 If Ukrainian forces do gain control over a member of the Russian 
regular forces, that individual soldier must be treated as a prisoner of war if 
                                                                                                                      
189. Id. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 149, at 16 (“Combatants are military personnel 
lawfully engaging in hostilities in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict. . . . 
[They] are also privileged belligerents, i.e., authorized to use force against the enemy on 
behalf of the State.” (emphasis in original)). 
190. See SOLIS, supra note 130, at 191–94 (noting that medical and religious personnel, 
though members of the armed forces, are considered noncombatants). 
191. Reeves & Lai, supra note 132, at 145. 
192. See supra section III(B) (portion on occupation of Crimea). 
193. “[T]hey bear no criminal responsibility for killing or injuring enemy military 
personnel or civilians taking an active part in hostilities, or for causing damage or 
destruction to property, provided their acts comply with the LOAC.” HANDBOOK, supra 
note 149, at 16. This privilege is often called “combatant immunity.” 
194. See SOLIS, supra note 130, at 188 (“[I]f a combatant is home on leave and in 
uniform, far from the combat zone, and is somehow targeted by an opposing combatant, 
she remains a legitimate target and may be killed—just as the opposing combatant, if 
discovered outside the combat zone, may be killed by his enemy.” (emphasis in original)). 
See also GREEN, supra note 150, at 124 (stating that combatants are lawful targets who are 
continuously a “legitimate object of attack, but only as long as they are capable of fighting, 
willing to fight or resist capture”). 
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he is operating in accordance with the obligations to attain combatant sta-
tus.195 
 
B. “Little Green Men” 
 
The “little green men”—faces covered, wearing unmarked olive uniforms, 
speaking Russian and using Russian weapons—have played a significant 
role in both the occupation of Crimea and the civil war in eastern 
Ukraine.196 While the Russian Federation initially denied any connection to 
these armed actors, it is now widely accepted that the “little green men” are 
Spetsnaz.197 These Spetsnaz commandos, practicing maskirovka or military 
deception, use uniforms devoid of any insignia to make it difficult to at-
tribute their actions to Russia.198 This unconventional method of warfare is 
intended to cause confusion and disorientation among the Ukrainian gov-
ernment and its allies in hopes of slowing any defensive response.199 While 
the tactic has been successful,200 it is questionable whether the unmarked 
Septsnaz commandos operating in Ukraine are complying with the legal ob-
ligations required to receive combatant status.201 
Similar to other members of the Russian military participating in the 
Ukraine-Russia international armed conflict, Spetsnaz commandos are as-
sumed to be combatants.202 Combatant status, however, is conditioned on 
                                                                                                                      
195. See supra text accompanying notes 153–56 (discussing combatant rights as a 
prisoner of war). 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28, (noting the role of the “little green 
men” in both Crimea and eastern Ukraine.) See also Editorial, The Siege of Mariupol, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-siege-of-mariupol-
1422490152 (“More recent sightings of ‘little green men’ in insignia-less uniforms suggest 
the presence of Russian special forces fighting alongside the rebels.”). 
197. See, e.g., Lucy Ash, How Russia Outfoxes its Enemies, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (Jan. 
28, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283 (noting that Russian President 
Vladimir Putin admitted to the use of Russian special forces in Crimea in an April 17, 
2014 speech). 
198. See id. The elements of “maskirovika” are surprise, camouflage, maneuvers 
intended to deceive, concealment, the use of decoys and military dummies, and 
disinformation. Id. 
199. See id. 
200. See, e.g., Russia’s Special Ops Invasion of Ukraine Has Begun, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 15, 
2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/15/russian-commandos-invade-
ukraine.html (discussing the confusion caused by the Spetsnaz in Ukraine). 
201. See supra section IV(A)(discussing the criteria for receiving combatant status). 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 189–92. 
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combatants distinguishing themselves from both the civilian population 
and the opposing armed forces.203 Distinction, the “foundation on which 
the codification of the laws and customs of war rests,”204 “ensure[s] respect 
for and protection of the civilian population and objects”205 and is an invio-
lable requirement for maintaining combatant status.206 Embedded within 
this requirement is an absolute obligation for the Spetsnaz commandos to 
clearly delineate themselves from the Ukrainian military and the civilians 
who unfortunately happen to live in the area of hostilities.207 This duty in-
cludes “not only physical separation of military forces and other military 
objectives form civilian objects . . . but also other actions, such as wearing 
uniforms.”208 Choosing to ignore this obligation by “masquerading as a ci-
vilian in order to mislead the enemy and avoid detection” may lead the 
Spetsnaz commandos to lose the privileges associated with combatant sta-
tus.209 
Yet wearing a uniform with a Russian insignia is not an absolute re-
quirement for the commandos to comply with the principle of distinc-
tion.210 The law of armed conflict mandates only that belligerents be distin-
                                                                                                                      
203. See GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 82, at 52. 
 
The drafters of the 1949 Convention, like those of the Hague Convention, considered 
that it was unnecessary to specify the sign which members of armed forces should have 
for purposes of recognition. It is the duty of each State to take steps so that members of 
its armed forces can be immediately recognized as such and to see to it that they are easily 
distinguishable from members of the enemy armed forces or from civilians. The 
Convention does not provide for any reciprocal notification of uniforms or insignia, but 
merely assumes that such items will be well known and that there can be no room for 
doubt. 
 
Id. 
204. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 143, at 598. 
205. AP I, supra note 8, art. 48. 
206. See DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29. 
207. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ARMED CONFLICT 118 (2005). 
208. W. Hays Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHICAGO 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 493, 514 (2003). 
209. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29 (noting that under 
customary international law deprivation of the privileges of a prisoner of war are imposed 
to those combatants that fail to comply with the principle of distinction). 
210. See Matthew R. Grant & Todd C. Huntley, Legal Issues in Special Operations, in U.S. 
MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 115. The authors argue that distinction 
comes in many forms, “including those forms which would obtain prisoner of war status 
for militias and organized resistance groups [which] belong to a belligerent state.” See also 
Parks, supra note 208, at 516–17 (noting that although the wearing of uniforms is the 
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guishable; it does not require that they advertise their nationality.211 Accord-
ing to law of armed conflict expert Hays Parks: 
 
The law of war regards a uniform as the principal way in which conven-
tional military forces distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
in international armed conflict. State practice (including US practice), 
treaty negotiation history, and the views of recognized law of war experts 
reveal (a) that the law of war obligation is one of distinction that other-
wise has eluded precise statement in all circumstances; (b) there is no 
agreed definition of uniform; (c) the uniform “requirement” is less strin-
gent with respect to Special Forces working with indigenous forces or ex-
ecuting a mission of strategic importance; and (d) a law of war violation 
occurs only where an act is perfidious, that is, done with an intent to de-
ceive, and the act is the proximate cause of killing, wounding, or capture 
of the enemy.212 
 
Spetsnaz commandos, carrying Russian manufactured arms openly, 
wearing unmarked-Russian type uniforms and speaking Russian, are clearly 
not impersonating the Ukrainian military nor are they attempting to blend 
into the civilian population.213 Their conduct, a regular tactic for a special 
operations force, is not perfidious as they remain distinguishable members 
of the Russian military.214 Their singular act of using unmarked uniforms 
does not constitute a violation of the principle of distinction; therefore, the 
“little green men” maintain the privileges associated with their status as 
combatants in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
typical means by which combatants distinguish themselves from the civilian population, it 
is not the only means). 
211. AP I, supra note 8, art. 44(3)(a)(b) (providing that a combatant retains his status if 
he carries his arms openly during each military engagement and “during such time as he is 
visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the 
launching of an attack in which he is to participate”). 
212. Parks, supra note 208, at 541. 
213. See Pifer, supra note 28 (noting that the “little green men” carried Russian 
weapons, wore Russian uniforms and were clearly professional soldiers). 
214. See Grant & Huntley, supra note 210, at 38–39 (discussing the regularity and 
legality of non-regular uniform use by Special Force units). 
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C. Ukraine Military Forces 
 
Simultaneously engaged in an international armed conflict with Russia215 
and a non-international armed conflict with separatist forces,216 Ukrainian 
military members have a different legal status that depends on whom they 
are fighting.217 The international armed conflict triggered by the occupation 
of Crimea makes the Ukrainian military members, similar to their Russian 
counterparts, combatants.218 The full panoply of rights and duties associat-
ed with combatant status are thus conferred on the Ukrainian forces en-
gaged with Russian forces.219 The status of these same Ukrainian military 
members engaged with separatists in eastern Ukraine is more complicated. 
Combatant status does not exist in a non-international armed conflict,220 
and the term “fighter,” commonly used to refer to both members of the 
State and non-State armed group, does not legitimatize participation in the 
hostilities.221 In fact, the current law regulating non-international armed 
conflict is silent with respect to the status of government forces in these 
internal wars.222  
This silence allows the Ukrainian government “to be free from interna-
tional regulation” concerning the status or nature of the actors they employ 
against the separatists.223 As Ukraine is engaged in an internal threat to its 
sovereignty, its military members are essentially participating in a domestic 
                                                                                                                      
215. See supra text accompanying notes 110–17 (explaining the existence of the 
international armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia). 
216. See supra text accompanying notes 118–23 (discussing the non-international 
armed conflict currently taking place in eastern Ukraine). 
217. See Summers, supra note 61, at 10 (noting that the co-existence of an international 
and non-international armed conflict in the same geographic region is possible). 
218. AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2). Again, medical and religious personnel in the 
Ukrainian military are noncombatants. See SOLIS, supra note 130, at 191–94. 
219. See AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2) (“Members of the armed forces of a Party to a 
conflict . . . are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in 
hostilities.”). 
220. CIHL RULES, supra note 138, r. 3 (noting that combatant status only exists in 
international armed conflicts). See also supra text accompanying notes 164–67 (discussing 
the irrelevance of status in a non-international armed conflict). 
221. See supra text accompanying notes 164–67, 181–84 (explaining who “fighter” 
refers to in a non-international armed conflict and the reasons for adopting the term). 
222. See Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 148–49 (“The NIAC 
status void is even more pronounced with respect to the status of government actors in 
NIAC.”) 
223. Id. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies                                2015 
 
397 
 
 
 
 
 
 
law enforcement operation.224 Ukrainian military members, in the context 
of the non-international armed conflict taking place in eastern Ukraine, 
therefore do not have a legal status as defined by international law.225 It is 
domestic law, not the status taxonomy used in an international armed con-
flict that allows Ukrainian military members the legal right to participate in 
the civil war.226 This absence of a combatant status, however, does not ab-
solve Ukrainian military members from certain international legal obliga-
tions. They remain accountable in international tribunals for their conduct 
in the hostilities227 and bound by numerous treaties for the means and 
methods used against the separatists.228 Yet international law is limited to 
regulating the behavior of Ukrainian forces, with the legality of their partic-
ipation remaining within the purview of the government of Ukraine.229 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
224. Id. 
225. Id. Professor Watts states: 
 
Although States have created rules regulating the conduct of their forces in 
NIAC, no positive international rules limit the nature of persons or 
organizations governments may employ in NIAC. Nor does the law of NIAC 
provide any general status for such forces. In fact, government forces’ status in 
NIAC generally can be said to constitute one of the remaining voids of the 
international laws of war. 
 
Id. 
226. Id. at 149. Some argue for a distinction-derived rule that limits direct 
participation in hostilities in a NIAC to armed forces or militia that, in practicality, results 
in a combatant-civilian status paradigm. See EMILY CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF 
COMBATANTS AND INSURGENTS UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 68 (2010). 
Professor Watts persuasively argues against this idea for logical, structural and practical 
reasons. See Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 160–64. 
227. Id. See also NIAC MANUAL, supra note 166, at 1 (“This Manual is a guide for 
behaviour in action during non-international armed conflict.”); Rome Statute, supra note 
81, art. 8(2)(c)–(f) (expressing jurisdiction over the conduct of NIAC). 
228. See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in 19 INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL MATERIALS 1523 (expanded to cover certain weapons use in a non-international 
armed conflict). 
229. See Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 149–53 (explaining 
reasons why government forces’ status in a non-international armed conflict remains a 
void in the laws of war). 
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D. Separatists 
 
The separatists, similar to the Ukrainian military members, are “fighters” in 
the civil war. Despite this commonality, the separatists are not the legal 
equal of the Ukrainian military members. Obviously their participation in 
the conflict is not condoned by the Ukrainian government, leaving them 
exposed to prosecution for “any acts that violate domestic law, even if they 
are not violations of the law of armed conflict.”230 This includes being 
prosecuted as a domestic criminal for attacking members of the Ukrainian 
military. Additionally, if captured, the separatists are not entitled to the ro-
bust protections provided to a prisoner of war in an international armed 
conflict, but rather they may be treated as criminals “subject to the domes-
tic penal regime” of Ukraine.231 Their conduct, appearance and claims to 
sovereignty are simply irrelevant and will not afford them immunity for 
their actions. Again, it is domestic law that is the relevant “legal source for 
both treatment obligations and immunities if any arising from participation 
in a non-international armed conflict.”232  
Perhaps more immediately consequential to the separatists is their ex-
posure to being targeted by Ukrainian military forces. The separatists—
well-armed with Russian weapons, structured in named groups, such as the 
United Armed Forces of Novorossiya,233 and executing coordinated mili-
                                                                                                                      
230. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 164, at 121. 
231. See Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 148 (“[O]pposition 
fighters captured in NIAC, no matter their appearance or conduct, are likely to be regard-
ed as mere criminals, fully subject to the domestic penal regime of the territorial State.”); 
Jelena Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOM-
ARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 77–78 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau 
eds., 2007) (“This coexistence can highlight the sharp legal differences in the two conflicts 
so that captured soldiers from an intervening state could be entitled to prisoner of war 
status, but captured rebels would not.”); NIAC MANUAL, supra note 166, ¶ 3.7 (discussing 
due process obligations applicable to domestic prosecutions for behavior in a NIAC). 
Interestingly, despite possessing the prerogative to prosecute the separatists as domestic 
criminals, Russian media sources have reported that the Ukrainian military has conducted 
“prisoner of war” exchanges with the militia members. See, e.g., Prisoner Swap between Do-
netsk Militias and Ukrainian Troops to be Resumed Soon, TASS (Oct. 16, 2014), http:// 
tass.ru/en/world/754832. 
232. Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 149. International law does 
afford the separatists the basic protections outlined in Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II. See generally supra text accompanying note 182. 
233. “Novorossiya” is a historic concept that refers to the Russian speaking portion 
of southeast Ukraine. Vladimir Putin used this reference to note that these regions were 
not part of Ukraine during the tsarist period inferring that this provides a justification for 
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tary operations234—constitute an organized armed group.235 As members of 
an organized armed group in a non-international armed conflict, the sepa-
ratists are “treated as analogous to members of the armed forces, and 
thereby remain targetable even when not participating” in hostilities.236 
While there is some controversy surrounding the question of when an indi-
vidual is a member of an organized armed group versus a civilian directly 
participating in hostilities,237 the actions of the separatists in eastern 
Ukraine make this more a theoretical question than a practical concern. 
Wearing uniforms, openly carrying arms, organized into units and employ-
ing military tactics, the separatists have most of the characteristics of a reg-
ular armed force, making them easily distinguishable from the civilian pop-
ulation.238 As a result, it is clear that the separatists are “attackable at any 
time during the period of their membership.”239 
This analysis of the separatists’ legal status is dependent upon the non-
international armed conflict not evolving into an international armed con-
flict. It is again important to highlight that “if the forces of another State 
intervene on behalf of the opposition, an international armed conflict en-
                                                                                                                      
military action. See Adam Taylor, “Novorossiya,” the Latest Historical Concept to Worry about in 
Ukraine, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
worldviews/wp/2014/04/18/understanding-novorossiya-the-latest-historical-concept-to-
get-worried-about-in-ukraine/. 
234. See, e.g., Mauldin, supra note 47. 
235. See Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 164, at 128–31. Professor 
Schmitt notes that “not all groups in a battlespace are ‘organized armed groups.’” Id. at 
128. For the group to meet the criteria of “organized” the group must exhibit a degree of 
structure and must act in a coordinated fashion. Id. at 129–30. To be “armed” the group 
must have “the capacity to carry out ‘attacks,’ defined in LOAC as ‘acts of violence against 
the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.’” Id. at 131 (citing AP I, supra note 8, art. 
49). 
236. Id. at 127. 
237. Compare ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at 33 (adopting the 
notion that an individual is a member of the organized armed group when they have 
“continuous function for the group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities”), 
with Watkin, supra note 175, at 641, and Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance, supra 
note 175, at 5 (criticizing the Interpretive Guidance recommendations). This is not an 
insignificant debate as an individual deemed a civilian is only targetable while they are 
directly participating in hostilities. See AP II, supra note 9, art. 13. 
238. See Andrew Roth, A Separatist Militia in Ukraine With Russian Fighters Holds a Key, 
NEW YORK TIMES (June 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/world/eur 
ope/in-ukraine-separatist-militia-with-russian-fighters-holds-a-key.html (describing the 
Voskok Battalion which is the largest separatist militia in Donetsk). 
239. See Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 164, at 132. 
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sues between the State and the State against whom the pre-existing rebel-
lion is under way; the conflict has been internationalized.”240 While it is cur-
rently unknown whether Russia is exercising a sufficiently high level of 
control over the separatists, if the conflict is internationalized, and if the 
separatists satisfy all the requisite criteria,241 they will become combatants 
similar to the members of other participating armed forces. This, of course, 
would be of significant consequence as the separatists would gain prisoner 
of war status and combatant immunity. 
 
E. Ukraine Nationalist Militias 
 
So-called Ukrainian self-defense militias have recently formed in response 
to what they view as the “ineffectiveness of the Ukraine Armed Forces in 
the face of pro-Moscow separatists and Russian troops in the country’s 
southeast.”242 These militias are not equipped or funded by the Ukrainian 
government,243 have an independent command structure244 and exist mostly 
on an ad hoc basis.245 While the Ukrainian government has not called for 
these groups to disband, and is seemingly appreciative of their efforts,246 
the affiliation between the government forces and the self-defense militias 
is based only upon their common concern to preserve a unified Ukraine. 
While these self-defense militias are volunteer groups, it is clear they are 
not controlled by the Ukrainian government and are better viewed as inde-
pendent actors in the Ukraine conflict. 
                                                                                                                      
240. Id. at 121. 
241. See supra text accompanying note 149 (outlining criteria for a militia members to 
be given combatant status). 
242. Jamie Dettmer, Ukraine Militias Warn of Anti-Kiev Coup, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 28, 
2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/28/ukraine-militias-threaten-anti-
kiev-coup.html. 
243. See Jacob Resneck, Pro-Ukraine Militias are Forming to Counter the pro-Russia 
Separatists, PRI (May 2, 2014), http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-05-02/pro-ukraine-militi 
as-are-forming-counter-pro-russia-separatists. 
244. See id. (discussing preliminary plans to set up a parallel command and control 
structure for the militias). 
245. See, e.g., Andrew Roth, Ukraine Faces Struggle to Gain Control of Militias, Including 
Those on its Side, NEW YORK TIMES (May 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/05/24/world/europe/ukraine-faces-struggle-to-gain-control-of-militias-including-
those-on-its-side.html?_r=0. 
246. See Dettmer, supra note 242 (quoting Ukrainian national security spokesman, 
Andriy Lysenko, as stating in reference to the militias “they provide their own assistance 
and we are grateful to them for this”). 
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As an unaffiliated volunteer group participating in the Ukraine civil 
war, the self-defense militias do not seem to “belong” to a party to the con-
flict as required by the law of armed conflict,247 and are similar to other pe-
ripheral actors on the battlefield, including individually armed civilians and 
criminal groups. It can be argued that these self-defense militias, who have 
a common interest with the Ukrainian government in fighting Russia, are 
adequately connected to the Ukrainian military through their shared ideol-
ogy. This argument, however, is unpersuasive as the Ukrainian government 
does not support these groups and has no oversight of their activities. The 
self-defense militias fighting in Ukraine, not belonging to the Ukrainian 
military, are therefore not combatants, but rather civilians choosing to take 
part in the hostilities.248 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
The occupation of Crimea and the civil war in eastern Ukraine, though in-
extricably linked, remain best viewed as parallel armed conflicts. This con-
flict classification paradigm allows for battlefield status determinations for 
those participating in the hostilities and helps to distinguish between those 
actively engaged in the Ukraine conflict and the civilians living through the 
war. The law of armed conflict “is predicated on a subtle equilibrium be-
tween two diametrically opposed impulses: military necessity and humani-
tarian considerations.”249 The balance between these countervailing con-
cepts “permeates throughout the entirety of the law ensuring that force is 
applied on the battlefield in a manner that allows for the accomplishment 
of the mission while simultaneously taking appropriate humanitarian con-
siderations into account.”250 Clarifying the legal status of the various actors 
on the Ukrainian battlefields helps to maintain this delicate balance and 
reinforces the law of armed conflict as an effective regulatory regime. 
                                                                                                                      
247. See GC III, supra note 8, art. 4(A)(2) (“Members of other militias and members of 
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250. Shane R. Reeves & Jeffrey S. Thurhner, Are We Reaching a Tipping Point? How 
Contemporary Challenges Are Affecting the Military Necessity-Humanity Balance, HARVARD 
NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL (June 24, 2013), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-
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